Essay: The EU Defense Fever, Trump 2.0 and the Necessary Pragmatism

Introduction

The EU has been diachronically dependent on the USA as far as its security is concerned. NATO is the cornerstone of the Western security architecture and the American contribution to it exceeds – by far – the one of other member states. NATO data covering the 2014-2024 period demonstrates that the US defense expenditure vacillated between $641.2bn (3,51% of its GDP) and $967.7bn (3,38% of its GDP). The UK followed with contributions between $55.7bn (2,08% of its GDP) and $82.1bn (2,33% of its GDP). In the same period, Germany spent between $39.8bn (1,19% of its GDP) and $97.6bn (2,12% of its GDP) and France between $43.4bn (1,78% of its GDP) and $64.2bn (2,06% of its GDP). The outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022 reminded the EU of the catalytic role the USA plays as the principal guarantor of the Old Continent’s security. Although President of France Emmanuel Macron had argued in 2019 that NATO was ‘becoming brain-dead’, the Russian invasion of Ukraine rather revived the Alliance.

The determination of Russia to achieve political objectives by violating the UN Constitutional Charter and using military force functioned as an electroshock for the EU, which could not any longer take peace in its own backyard for granted. EU members states, which are in NATO, started to drastically increase their defense expenditures from 2022 until 2024. Germany, which had spent $62bn in 2021, managed to reach the amount of $97.6bn in 2024. And France, which had paid $56.4bn in 2021, spent $64.2bn in 2024.The general increase in defense spending was aligned with the commitment of the US administration under President Joe Biden to support the Alliance and defend Ukraine. President Donald Trump, however, does not agree with the policy of his predecessor and this puts the EU in an awkward and complicated position.

What is at Stake for the EU?

President Donald Trump tends to view transatlantic relations within NATO as a business affair. During his first presidency (2017-2021) he was constantly demanding that other member states pay more. His insistence yielded some results. Germany, which had paid $41.6bn for defense in 2016, spent $58.6bn in 2020. And France increased its contribution from $44.2bn in 2016 to $52.5bn in 2020. As already discussed, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia accelerated the spending trend of EU member states that are in NATO. What is currently different in comparison to the first Trump administration is the conflict in Ukraine itself in pair with the possibility of a US-Russian rapprochement and its potential implications for European security. Having said that the EU does not only need to invest more in defense but also develop scenarios in which the US would arguably act as its protector.

The EU needs to proceed under conditions which do not favor harmonious transatlantic coordination – in startling contrast with the years of President Joe Biden. It is problematic for the EU that the US administration under President Trump makes decisions without valuing its international role. In a remarkable example of the current American attitude Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth expressed his ‘loathing for the European pathetic free-loading’ in a leaked Signal chat. The leaked chat referred to the EU naval presence in the Red Sea that is of defensive nature in comparison to the more aggressive operation ‘Prosperity Guardian’ led by the USA and the UK, and the March 2025 US attacks against Yemen. In particular, the EU has embarked on the so-called ‘ASPIDES’ operation. ‘ASPIDES’, where Greece remains among the crucial actors, manages to protect ships by intercepting Houthis' strikes but is not targeting the rebel group itself as the USA (and the UK) do. In the very same chat, Vice President JD Vance wrote that he would ‘hate bailing Europe out again’.  JD Vance had already caused some frustration to Europeans with the speech he delivered at the Munich Security Conference in February 2025.

The EU Response and the Greek Sensitivity

Designing its future strategy, the EU issued its white paper for European defense in March 2025. Among other things, it will seek to obtain greater military capabilities, invest more on defense, and step up support for Ukraine. In so doing, it plans to spend circa €800bn on defense through loans and leverage as well as to offer to member state some flexibility from strict fiscal rules. Obviously, the success of the new European project depends on the commitment of member states to collaborate and deliver. Member states do not always link defense spending to the same priorities. Spain, for example, prioritizes the fight against terrorism, border control and the prevention of cyberattacks more than others, which emphasize missile systems, ammunition, drones etc. Also, there are member states which will see their own defense companies thrive in the new era, principally Germany, France and Italy, and others that do not expect tangible economic benefits for their firms. Further to this, some disagreements have been already monitored on the criteria for companies to be eligible to EU defense funds.

The EU ambition to make solid steps in the defense sector goes beyond the recently issued white paper and includes other measures taken prior such as the European Defense Fund, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production and the European Defense Industry Reinforcement. The lack of a clear foreign policy doctrine to accompany these initiatives is missing, however. In the case of the Ukraine war, for example, the EU is lacking a specific policy about its future outcome. The EU is eager to support Ukraine but only to a degree that this be might somewhat acceptable by the Kremlin.  Also, it disagrees with the personal diplomacy of President Donald Trump in approaching his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin but fails to discuss realistic conditions under which the war could perhaps end. It is thus locked in a labyrinth where both the continuation of the war and its termination look painful and rather expects the result of the American mediation. Critics might even argue that the EU has become irrelevant. To no one’s surprise, member states disagree on their attitude vis-à-vis Russia. Some opt for a hardline policy, others prefer a milder approach, others are rather indifferent due to geographical distance and others favor a rapprochement with Moscow. Foreign policy disagreements at the EU level expand into other regions such as the Middle East and the Red Sea.

Greece is actively engaged in defense activities – principally due to the Turkish threat. In 2024 it spent $7.6bn (3,08% of its GDP) from $5.2bn in 2014 (2,2% of its GDP). Among other things, it has collaborated with Germany on cyclical arm deals.  When Chancelor Olaf Scholz visited Athens in October 2022 the two countries agreed for Greece to provide Ukraine with BMP-1 tanks and receive MARDER vehicles. Moreover, Greece has signed a bilateral defense agreement with France and has decided to modernize its armed forces. It will spend €25bn toward this direction over the next decade. Against this backdrop, it is joining the chorus in support of EU defense efforts but remains cautious of possible partnerships with non-EU member states, namely Türkiye. In its interest to quickly respond to new security challenges the EU should not overlook Greek and Cypriot interests, Athens warns. Of course, there is an opportunity ahead for the Greek government: to act diplomatically and connect the joint interest of Brussels and Ankara to work together in the defense field with conditions beneficial to all sides involved.

Charting a Way Forward

The second Trump presidency is pushing the EU to advance its re-armament, a policy that had been put forward during his first administration and further accelerated in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.  The process is expected to be difficult. The EU needs to make sure that new defense investments would not undermine or sideline social policies and explain how future competitiveness to be achieved through these investments could offset potential adjustments in the short-term. In that regard, a pan-European discussion is a sine qua non parameter. As Matthias Waechter recently argued, the call for a new momentum in European defense should not only be addressed to EU member states but also directly to people. European citizens must be stakeholders in the forging of a common European security identity. In other words, democratic principles are not to be ignored because of the urgency of the matter in realizing new defense projects.

Last but not least the EU ought to be pragmatic in raising expectations. Although it is significant for it to become strategically autonomous, the objective is not to militarily replace or compete with the USA. It is to cooperate with the USA within NATO and increase the EU defense contribution to a degree that will possibly allow transatlantic synergies to deepen and the EU to better negotiate with its ally. Notwithstanding evident problems in transatlantic relations at the beginning of the second Trump presidency, institutional mechanisms are still in place, and dialogue continues in different formats. On 18 April 2025, for instance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio attended the Paris summit and said that the Germans and the French (together with the British) ‘were very constructive and helpful’. NATO meetings of foreign ministers are also regularly organized. The need for transatlantic coordination is not necessarily inimical to the pursuit of the EU strategic autonomy, in this case in the field of defense.

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Dr George N. Tzogopoulos is a lecturer at the European Institute in Nice (Cife), a senior fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), and a Research Associate at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA).