The state of relations between Greece and North Macedonia - six years after the signing of the Prespa Agreement

On 18 June 2024 we marked the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Prespa Agreement. Today, however, we can speak of a challenge to the treaty that could jeopardize the progress made by Greece and North Macedonia in recent years, which could have a spiraling effect on the region. But let us examine how we got to this point.

The agreement signed by Alexis Tsipras and Zoran Zaev, constituted a milestone in normalizing the bilateral relations of two neighboring states in the turbulent Balkan region. At its heart was a solution of the so-called name-dispute, that had caused so many problems, and to many looked “intractable”, as the dispute had resisted all efforts of solving it since the beginning of the 1990s. However, the two leaders that came in power after 2015, showed the necessary flexibility and pragmatism that allowed for a historic compromise: in return for a new, erga omnes name - Republic of North Macedonia – Athens recognized the identity and language of the ethnic Macedonians.

At the same time, the agreement provided for much more than simply solving the name-dispute and allowing for the full normalization of bilateral relations. Its second part was dedicated to “the intensification and enrichment of cooperation between the two parties”, providing opportunities for the development of close cooperation in many areas. In April 2019, the1st Greece-North Macedonia High-Level Cooperation Council (HLCC) took place in Skopje, where the two governments signed an Action Plan on the implementation of the Prespa Agreement. The Action Plan envisaged the establishment of joint committees in many areas of bilateral cooperation, whiletwo memorandums were signed in Skopje: a memorandum of cooperation on the Acceleration of the Integration Process of the Republic of North Macedonia into the European Union, and a Memorandum of Understanding concerning the establishment of a Steering Committee for Economic Cooperation.

New Democracy comes to power. The evolution of bilateral relations between Greece and North Macedonia June 2019 – May 2024

The New Democracy (ND) party that won the Greek parliamentary elections in June 2019 had rejected the Prespa Agreement and had voted against its ratification, as it regarded it as “bad for Greek national interests”, a view shared by a majority of ND voters and elected representatives of the party. Following however the formation of the new Greek government, the leader of the party and new Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, clarified that “his government would respect the Prespa Agreement”. High ranking members of ND were relieved and would privately welcome the resolution ofa “foreign policy headache” by the previous Syriza government, that had paid a high political cost at the elections. Furthermore, the new Greek government was aware thatGreece’s closest allies and friends were approving of the agreement and appreciating its importance for regional stability.

The new government was then called to manage relations with North Macedonia under the twin dynamics of a hostile domestic electorate on the one hand, and the realization of a highly supportive international setting for the agreement. It chose to practice a difficult “balancing act”. Internally, it maintained at large the narrative of a “bad agreement for Greek national interests”, meticulously avoiding any positive commentary for the agreement, but nevertheless calling upon North Macedonia to “strictly implement the agreement”. Furthermore, in order not to upset internal opposition to the Prespa Agreement, it avoided the ratification in Greek Parliament of the two memorandums of understanding that had been signed by the previous SYRIZA government and an additional agreement (Technical Arrangement between the Ministries of Defense of the two countries on the Air Policing of Skopje FIR) that had been prepared by the previous government and signed in December 2019. In addition, it effectively “turned its back” on the operation of bilateral committees that had been established based upon the agreement, like the Joint Interdisciplinary Committee of Experts on historic, archeological and educational matters, while it simply ignored the necessity of replacing road signs under the name “FYROM or Skopje” with that of “North Macedonia”, something that would bewilder and irritate ethnic Macedonians visiting Greece.  

Although refusing toembrace the Prespa Agreement, and the opportunities it provided for the development of a “strategic partnership” with a neighboring state – something that the North Macedonia’ government was very much eager to see – Athens would nevertheless work to advance bilateral relations with North Macedonia in selective areas. Especially on energy cooperation and connectivity, as Athens would seek to bolster Greece’s position as an energy hub in Southeastern Europe, particularly following the Russian invasion in Ukraine. It also promoted the growth of bilateral trade and Greek investments in North Macedonia: by the end of 2022 the value of bilateral trade had increased at 1.6 billion euro and the value of Greek investments at 620 million euro. The Greek government furthermore repeatedly issued declarations of support to North Macedonia’s start of EU accession negotiations, as the latter process was post-2018 undermined by successive vetoes (initially by France and later by Bulgaria

Thus, it can be argued that in its foreign policy conduct vis-a-vis North Macedonia Athens was not totally consumed by its ideological hostility to the Prespa Agreement. Even selectively – and although many of its critics would claim it was totally “insufficient” as Athens was losing a “historic opportunity” for the deepening of bilateral relations - it pushed forward a “positive bilateral agenda”. It is indicative that the Greek Foreign Minister would even describe Greece as North Macedonia’s “closest partner and ally in the region” to the great disappointment of ND supporters that opposed the Prespa Agreement.

VMRO-DPMNE comes to power; another challenge to the Prespa Agreement and a new phase in Greece-North Macedonia relations

VMRO-DPMNE’s coming to power following the May 8^th parliamentary elections in North Macedonia, has signaled a new phase for bilateral relations between Greece and North Macedonia. VMRO-DPMNE came to power totally rejecting the foreign policy of its predecessor and in particular it’s handling of relations with Greece and Bulgaria. For VMRO-DPMNE the 2017 Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborhood and Cooperation with Bulgaria, the Prespa Agreement and the so-called French proposal that constituted the basis for the 2022 agreement on the start of North Macedonia’s accession process to the EU (requiring a Constitutional Amendment) are “bad agreements for Macedonia’s national interests”. Concerning the new Constitutional name of the country, the new Prime Minister and leader of VMRO-DPMNE, Christian Mitskoski, would make it clear during the pre-election campaign that he regards it as “shameful” and would not utter the adjective “North” publicly.

According to VMRO-DPMNE’s narrative, that was supported by the bulk of ethnic Macedonia’s voters during the last elections, these agreements “have undermined the identity and national dignity of ethnic Macedonians” and should be overturned. Among thecore of VMRO-DMPNE supporters and intellectuals there is an almost inherent “Bulgarophobia and “Grecophobia” and deep skepticism towards North Macedonia’s Western partners. Especially the latter are seen as actively undermining both their sense of ownership of the State (with the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001, altering the balance of inter-ethnic relations in North Macedonia) and their identity (with the Prespa Agreement and the French proposal of 2022). And although reluctant and afraid of openly admitting it (as it could be branded as an “anti-Western” party, like Levica the radical left-wing party in the country) VMRO-DPMNE is deeply skeptical towards the pro-Western orientation of North Macedonia. Thus, the new Prime Minister has made clear that he regards Hungary as the “preferredpartner” for North Macedonia that would“ represent its interests”.

Thus, the recent political changes in North Macedonia less than two months since the presidential and parliamentary elections have produced a noticeable deterioration in the bilateral relations with Greece. First as a result of the new President’s (Siljanovska-Davkova) refusal to take the oath on the Constitutional name of the country; and then as a result of Mitskoski’s insistence that internally he would refuse to utter the adjective “North” (although many would point out that he is already altering his initial position, as hetook the oath on “North Macedonia’s Constitution”, while also accepting that “abroad he would use the Constitutional name of the country”). Bothhave used flimsy legal arguments to claim that they are not violating the Prespa Agreement (“it is our basic human right”), although they are notordinary citizens but state officials.

The way forward: stop challenging the Prespa Agreement

It is clear that the behavior of the new elected leadership of North Macedonia has damaged bilateral relations with Greece, casting a serious doubt over its commitment to the Prespa Agreement. In Greece, it has produced an avalanche of negative media coverage and political reactions, becoming one of the favorite topics of criticism of the far-right against the government. It has also brought to the fore calls for an “abandonment of the Prespa Agreement”, through its annulment, even inside the governing party.

It is more than imperative to stop challenging the Prespa Agreement and to treat it as the cornerstone of good-neighborly relations between Greece and North Macedonia. Any actual abandonment of the agreement, through its non-implementation, or even worseits annulment, would throw relations between the two states “into the unknown”. For Greece in particular, it would reopen the “name-dispute”, signifying the return into an era where it would spend valuable diplomatic capital into an issue that many (including many of Greece’s closest partners and allies) would regard as “petty nationalistic”, and in any case “irrational”, as it denied a basic right of self-determination to a sovereign people. The annulment of the treaty would in addition mean the end of any hopes North Macedonia still have of joining the European Union, and that could also affect inter-ethnic relations inside the country.While it would also be bad news for the Western Balkans, as it would add to the sense of a region full of “intractable problems” and “nationalistic political elites”, making the region even more vulnerable to non-European malign influences.

At a time when European security is being threatened by Russian revisionism in Ukraine and security in Eastern Mediterranean is being tested by the violent conflict in Gaza that threatens to expand elsewhere, we do not have the luxury of re-opening “old wounds”, complicating even more stability in south-eastern Europe. Its time for responsible statesmanship, by all parties concerned.

Dr Yorgos Christidis is Professor at the Department of Balkan, Slavonic and Eastern Studies, University of Macedonia and Senior Researcher at ELIAMEP.